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The Conflict Between Free Trade and Public Health Measures: 
The Role of Science 
Summary 
The needs of the free trade regime and governments' legitimate regulatory aims in 
the area of public health protection conflict. Government health measures create 
barriers to free trade and are thus disciplined by the trade regime. 
This conflict is addressed in the rules of the World Trade Organization, in the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. This 
Agreement uses science to mediate the conflict. The reason for the reliance on 
science is the view that it provides a neutral, universally-valid discipline and that 
thus the results of testing health measures for scientific validity would be acceptable 
to both parties in a dispute. 
This uncritical approach towards science is called into question. An analysis of the 
relevant science-based disciplines of the SPS Agreement and their interpretation in 
WTO dispute settlement shows the flaws in this system. A re-evaluation of the WTO 
rules governing health regulation is called for. 
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Part 1: Problem Definition 
1.1 Introduction 
The protection of public health is an important part of the duties of national government. It 
requires the creation of various regulations and other measures to deal with potential health 
risks. However, these measures often have a negative impact on international trade. As 
such, they have been subject to the scrutiny of the organs of the multilateral trade order, 
represented by the World Trade Organization, 1 under internationally-agreed-upon rules. 2 
These rules are embodied in the various international free trade agreements that form part 
of what is now known as WTO law. 
This paper aims to examine the way in which WTO law seeks to resolve the conflicting 
values of trade liberalisation and the protection of public health. It will focus specifically on 
the role given to science and scientific analysis in current WTO rules policing the use of 
health regulations by national governments. The appropriateness of such rules will be 
questioned in the light of the application thereof by the dispute settlement organs of the 
WTO. 
The discussion will start by situating itself within the broader ambit of what is known as the 
trade linkage debate, in order to provide the context within which the more specific issue of 
the conflict between trade and public health can be understood. The trade linkage debate 
received much attention in the run up to the Millennium Round of trade negotiations held in 
Seattle under the auspices of the WT0.3 It deals with the impact of continuing trade 
liberalisation on other important social values, such as the protection of public health, labour 
standards, environmental protection and cultural identity. ft is only within the general 
The World Trade Organization [hereinafter referred to as the WTO] was established as a result of the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, by the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
[hereinafter referred to as the Marrakesh Agreement], reprinted in The Results of the Uroguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts (1994) GATT Secretariat, Geneva at 6-18. 
2 Other multilateral trade regimes exist on a smaller scale, such as, inter alia, the European Union 
[hereinafter referred to as the EU] and the North American Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter referred to as 
NAFTA]. However, this study will focus on the situation under WTO law as this organisation represents the 
most global example of a multilateral trade regime, having a current membership of 135 countries. Its rules, 
therefore, have the broadest impact on national health policies. 
3 The Third WTO Ministerial Conference, held on 30 Nov.-3 Dec. 1999.(Hereinafter referred to as the 
Millennium Round] Masses of protestors, representing various social concerns such as labour and environment 
surrounding converged on the conference center. This is an indication of the importance of finding a resolution 
to the conflicts between trade liberalisation and societal values. 
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understanding of the interaction between free trade and national social policies, that the 
trade/public health linkage can be fully comprehended. 
A specific discussion of the reasons for the conflict between free trade and the protection of 
public health will follow. This section will aim at providing an understanding of the relevance 
of the issue. Finally, this introductory section will conclude by elucidating the role of 
scientific analysis in the resolution of this conflict. 
Part 2 of this paper will focus specifically on the provisions of the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,4 and their interpretation by WTO 
dispute settlement organs. This section will aim to show the effects of the use of scientific 
analysis to evaluate national health regulations. The central theme in this discussion will be 
the need for recognition of the pervasiveness of scientific uncertainty in the rules governing 
health regulations. 
In Part 3, procedural aspects of the role of science in the mediation of the trade/public 
health conflict will be examined. These relate to problems of adjudication of disputes under 
the SPS Agreement's science-based disciplines. 
This paper will conclude with a recommendation for the re-evaluation of the current WTO 
rules governing the balancing of the needs of the global trading system with the legitimate 
regulatory aims of national governments in the area of health protection. 
1.2 The Linkage between Free Trade and Other Societal Values 
Free trade enables countries to specialise in producing the goods or services in which they 
have a comparative advantage, thus maximising global wealth. 5 It also has beneficial side 
effects, such as the promotion of co-operation between nations, thus improving the 
prospects for peace, and accelerating the spread of technological innovation throughout the 
world. Clearly then, free trade is an important societal goal. It is thus important to protect the 
advances that have been made in trade liberalisation from protectionist attempts by national 
4 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 1994 [hereinafter referred to 
as the SPS Agreement], in annex IA to the Marrakesh Agreement, reprinted in The Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts (1994) GATT Secretariat. Geneva at 69-84. 
5 The theory of comparative advantage was expounded by Adam Smith in his famous book The Wealth 
of Nations. This represented a break away from the mercantilism of the past, which saw protecting local 
industry from imports as the way to secure the welfare of the country. Protectionism has been blallled for the 
trade wars that escalated into actual wars, as well as the financial crisis of the 1930s. 
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governments. These positive aspects of trade liberalisation led to efforts on the international 
arena to secure the benefits of free trade in multilateral agreements, such as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947.6 Various rounds of multilateral trade negotrations 
followed under the auspices of GA TT, increasing the areas covered by free trade 
agreements. Finally, as a result of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the 
World Trade Organization came into existence on 1January1995.7 The WTO has become 
the main forum for multilateral trade negotiations. 
However, in recent times, the euphoria enveloping this new organisation and increasing 
trade liberalisation initiatives has dissipated. It has become increasingly apparent that free 
trade, and the economic growth that accompanies it, has its price in other societal values, 
such as labour standards, public health and environmental protection. The ability of 
governments to protect and promote societal aims through regulations is now limited by 
their obligations under WTO law. This is because domestic regulations often have a 
restrictive impact on imports. The response of the free trade regime to these types of 
regulations has been to label them "non-tariff barriers" to trade and thus subject them to 
WTO disciplines. It is currently being questioned whether these disciplines sufficiently take 
into account the importance of these other values for society, or whether they are skewed in 
favour of free trade. 
There is currently growing public pressure for the inclusion of social policy considerations 
within the multilateral trade regime and increased recognition of the linkages between trade 
and societal values.8 
6 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 [hereinafter referred to as GATT 1947], adopted at 
the conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Environment, opened for signature on Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, reprinted in The 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts (1994) GATT Secretariat, 
Geneva 486-558. This agreement was never ratified but came into force through the Protocol of Provisional 
Application. It did not itself create an international organisation, but one came into being de facto to coordinate 
the application of the GAIT. This agreement was incorporated by reference into the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the GATT 1994] by art. l(A) thereof and its provisions are 
thus still applicable today. 
7 By the Marrakesh Agreement supra fu. 1. 
8 Protestors gathered at the conference center in Seattle at the commencement of the Millennium Round 
of trade negotiations (supra fu. 3), calling for a halt to further trade liberalisation efforts until a resolution for 
the conflict between trade and other important societal values has been found 
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1.3 The Conflict between Free Trade and Public Health Measures 
One important societal value which is impacted by continuing trade liberalisation, is that of 
public health protection. Normally governments have regulations in place to deal with 
potential risks to human, animal or plant life or health within their boundaries. Such 
measures are seen by governments as an exercise of their sovereign authority to regulate 
domestic affairs. However, the increasingly free flow of agricultural goods and other 
products with possible health implications across national borders, means that these 
regulations are no longer enough. Governments now have to regulate imports to ensure 
that they meet their health standards. Different governments have different health priorities 
which are manifested in their health regulations. 
Clearly, such health measures have a negative effect on international trade. Thus, free 
trade regimes9 impose certain disciplines on the use of government regulations for the 
protection of health. The policing of national health measures by the multilateral trade 
regime, as embodied in WTO law, is based on the core question of when the needs of the 
system of free trade should override national choices in the field of protection of public 
health. This boils down to the basic issue of the appropriate level of decision-making in 
health matters, in cases where international trade is impacted. To what extent should the 
sovereign authority of national governments to act in the interests of their citizens on health 
matters be restricted by the multilateral trade regime? The search for balance between the 
objectives of the trade regime and the legitimate regulatory aims of WTO Members is 
reflected in the provisions of various WTO agreements. 
This paper will focus on the use of scientific analysis to achieve this balance, as reflected in 
the SPS Agreement. Thus, before undertaking brief examination of the relevant provisions 
of the applicable agreements, it is necessary to provide a general introduction to the role of 
science in limiting the ability of national governments to enact public health measures. 
9 Such as the WTO, the EU and NAFT A 
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1.4 Introduction to the Role of Science in Policing Health Measures 
Science is playing an increasingly important role in the structure and functioning of 
international agreements limiting the capacity of governments to enact measures for the 
protection of public health. 10 It thus acts on the interface between the conflicting societal 
values of economic growth through trade liberalisation and the protection of public health. 11 
The reason for the appeal of science for international traqe negotiators lies in its 
appearance of objectivity and universal validity. Science enjoys enormous prestige in our 
technological world. It seems to provide rational and testable results. If national measures 
can be tested against neutral rules, the results would be acceptable to both parties. The use 
of science as the standard against which to evaluate the validity of health regulations is 
aimed at reducing international disputes in this important area and providing clear 
guidelines for national decision-makers. It would seem to provide the perfect tool for 
balancing the needs of the trade regime with the protection of public health. If health 
measures cannot be scientifically justified it seems beyond dispute that they do not serve to 
protect public health, but are instead unjustified barriers to international trade. 
This paper aims to examine the appropriateness of this emphasis on scientific justification in 
seeking the balance between free trade and public health goals. For this reason, it is 
necessary to first understand the role that science plays within the national regulatory 
process before examining its role in the multilateral trade order. 
National health regulation is frequently based on scientific findings. Without such basis, 
regulatory measures would be subject to criticism on national level. Scientific assessments 
of risks to the public determine areas in which regulatory action is necessary, and science is 
10 The field of health is currently unique in its use of scientific analysis for determining the validity of 
national regulations, despite the fact that other areas, such as that of environmental protection, also use 
scientific studies as a basis for regulatory action. See further on this issue, in particular as regards the 
emergence of science-based disciplines in NAFT A and WTO ritles, David A Wirth, "Symposium: The role of 
science in the Uruguay Round and NAFT A trade disciplines," Cornell International Law Journal 27 (1994 ): 
817. 
II The emergence of science as the principal touchstone for establishing the validity of national health 
regulation is not only reflected in the results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations ( 15 Dec. 
1993, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations [hereinafter 
referred to as the Final Act], and the Marrakesh Agreement (supra fu. 1), substantially reprinted in The Results 
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts (1994) GAIT Secretariat, Geneva 
at 1-482), but also ill the North American Free Trade Agreement ( 17 Dec. 1992, Can. -Mex. -U.S., 32 I.L.M. 
296 and 32 I.L.M. 605) [hereinafter referred to as NAFTA]. 
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also used to evaluate the efficacy of the various possible measures in order to design an 
appropriate regulation. 12 
However, that is not the whole story. In practice, regulatory design is more than just a 
scientific discipline. Public health measures often also reflect social policy choices. One 
must bear in mind that regulations are drafted in a particular economic, social and political 
context. As a result, disparate regulatory measures result across national boundaries even 
where the scientific rationale for the measures is the same. Science does inform the 
process, but is not decisive in determining the outcome. 
For this reason, a distinction has been drawn between two aspects of the regulatory 
process: risk assessment and risk management. Risk assessment is the scientific process 
of determining the potential risk in the light of the potential for harm in a substance and the 
predicted exposure to that substance. 13 Risk management is the process of evaluating the 
available regulatory options and choosing among them. 14 This is a policy decision-making 
process and involves not only a consideration of scientific evidence but also the making of 
value judgements based on political, social and economic considerations. 15 
The usefulness of this distinction for the role of science as part of the intemational discipline 
imposed on national health measures, lies in its recognition of the different nature of these 
two aspects of the regulatory process. Risk assessment is explicitly scientific and can thus 
be evaluated according to scientific criteria. On the other hand, the acknowledgement that 
risk management is a policy area allows the recognition of the sovereign right of national 
governments to make their own decisions in this area. Thus, this aspect of the regulatory 
process cannot be evaluated using science-based disciplines. The rules of the multilateral 
trade regime have consequently been fashioned in a way which takes this distinction into 
account when judging the validity of national health measures. 
12 Jeffery Atik, "Symposium - Institutions for international economic integration: Science and 
international regulatory convergence," Journal of International Law and Business 17 (1997): 736 at 736. 
13 See Vern R. Walker, "Keeping the WTO from becoming the "World Trans-science Organization": 
scientific uncertainty, science policy, and factfinding in the growth hormones dispute," Cornell International 
Law Journal 31 (1998): 251at263-267 for an in-depth discussion of the main elements ofa risk assessment. 
14 See Walker, (supra fu. 13 at 267-277) for a description of the three functions that form part of risk 
management. 
15 An example of this two-phase process would be the establishment, by scientific analysis of empirical 
data, of the existence of a 20% risk that persons consuming tinned fruit from a certain country where a 
particular preservative is used will contract a certain skin rash, followed by the decision by national regulatory 
authorities of one country to ban imports of tinned fruit from the exporting country in order to achieve a chosen 
zero-risk level of protection. Another importing country may have different priorities and be prepared to 
tolerate a higher level of risk, thus coming to the risk management decision of requiring only that the importer 
label the fruit in a way that warns consumers of the potential health risk. 
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However, even in the evaluation of the risk assessment part of the regulatory process, the 
use of science should be approached with caution. The traditionally uncritical view taken of 
science by the law is no longer acceptable. It is crucial to recognise that an element of 
scientific uncertainty is present in most risk assessments.16 This is because science is not 
absolute, but is inherently historical and what is valid today may be totally disproved 
tomorrow. Further, there can be more than one scientifically valid conclusion drawn from the 
same data. This is known as the problem of duelling science. The state of scientific 
knowledge in a particular area is often limited and scientific analyses are thus made using 
certain assumptions, incorporating value judgements.17 These value-based assumptions on 
what risks are acceptable, are referred to as "science policy'' and pervade even risk 
assessments. 18 Thus science is not the objective, universally valid, neutral standard it 
appears to be. Any disciplines involving scientific justifications must thus take this important 
limitation into account. This is particularly so in the field of health, due to the complexity of 
the human body and the influence of psychological, environmental and social factors on 
human health.19 
It now remains to examine the applicable provisions of WTO law to see the way in which 
science is used to find an acceptable balance between trade and health goals. A brief 
discussion of the rules under GA TT and developments leading to the current situation will 
be followed by a more specific discussion of the way in which science has been used in the 
disciplines of the SPS Agreement. 
16 Walker, (supra fn. 13 at 258) identifies three main categories of uncertainty in risk assessment, 
namely measurement uncertainty, uncertainty associated with the use of scientific models and gaps in data. 
17 The fact that science incorporates cultural and social biases is demonstrated by the disparate scientific 
consensuses that exist across countries. The example of Nazi racial studies and Lysenko's genetics in the USSR 
is raised by Atik (supra fn. 12 at fn. 11 ). 
18 Walker, supra fn. 13, at 304. 
19 Atik, (supra fn. 12, at 747-748) states: "In general, the science which underlies regulation, including 
SPS regulation, is science applied to immense complexity. The human body, the ecology of a particular locale 
and the interplay of social factors are all enormously complex systems, about which strong scientific assertion 
breaks down. Heuristics (rules-of-thumb) replace direct observation and synthesis in guiding the formation of 
scientific consensus and introduce the possibility of multiple outcomes." 
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Part 2: Substantive Legal Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
Before examining the actual WTO rules governing national regulatory measures in the area 
of public health, it is important to point out that these rules embody mainly negative 
obligations, that is, they limit the ability of governments to enact health measures.20 A 
measure falling foul of the requirements set by the applicable provision is in violation of 
these obligations and must be removed or corrected. On the other hand, no positive 
obligations to achieve certain minimum standards in the area of health protection exist. 
This is due to the fact that the WTO has no supranational standard-setting authority.21 It 
operates purely on the basis of intergovernmental agreements. As it wouJd be very difficult 
to achieve consensus among all WTO Members regarding minimum applicable standards 
for health protection, it is unlikely that the responsibility for setting standards of health 
protection could be exercised at WTO level.22 This makes even more important the 
achievement of an appropriate balance by WTO rules, leaving national governments 
sufficient freedom to enact efficient regulations for the protection of public health. 
Before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, Members could adopt and maintain measures 
for the protection of human, animal and plant life or health under a general exception for 
such measures from all GA TT obligations. These obligations include particularly the 
prohibition on quantitative restrictions to trade23 and the duty to provide non-discriminatory 
treatment24 to imports from GA TT Contracting Parties. The exception for health measures 
was contained in article XX{b) of GATT 1947, and was limited by the requirements that 
these measures not be applied in a manner that constitutes a means of arbitrary 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions exist, or a disguised restriction 
20 See further on this issue Wirth, supra fn. 10 at 818. 
21 This is in marked contrast to the situation within the EU, where rules for the free movement of goods, 
services and persons fall under what is known as the First Pillar, where decisions are taken on supranational 
level by EU institutions. Thus negative integration (removal of barriers to the free trade) can proceed hand in 
hand with positive integration (creation of harmonised regulations on EU level to deal with the negative effects 
of liberalisation). 
22 The question whether the WTO can or even should become a "global meta-regulator", with the 
authority to adopt health policies on acceptable risk levels has been raised. See Walker, supra fn. 13 at 255. 
23 Article XI:l of the GAIT 1947. 
24 This duty was set out in article I of GAIT 1947 (supra fn. 6) , obliging each Contracting Party to 
extend any advantage it provides to any other country, to all GATT Contracting Parties (hereinafter referred to 
as the Most Favoured Nation Treatment obligation), and article III, establishing the duty to treat imports no less 
favorably than domestic products (hereinafter referred to as the National Treatment obligation). 
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on international trade, 25 and that the measure be necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health.26 The burden was on the respondent Member to prove that its measure 
fulfilled the requirements of the exception. The "necessary'' requirement was interpreted to 
mean that the measure must be the least trade-restrictive or GA TT-inconsistent measure 
possible. 27 No scientific justification requirement was read into this test. It is clear from these 
provisions that GATT 1947 provided a limited exception for health measures, but did not 
create specific disciplines regulating the use of these measures.28 
The GA TT rules were seen as ineffective in dealing with non-tariff barriers to trade, which 
included regulations. For this reason, in 1979, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade29 was adopted, regulating compulsory government specifications for industrial and 
agricultural products.30 It aimed at reducing trade distortions caused by differences in 
national regulations. The criterion for validity of regulations under the Standards Code was 
whether the measure created an unnecessary obstacle to international trade. There was still 
no explicit reference to scientific justification, although the possibility of obtaining advice 
from technical expert groups was envisaged. 31 The Standards Code had limited effect in 
reducing the divergence in technical regulations.32 
In the 1980s, a dispute arose between the US and the EU, concerning an EU ban on the 
use of hormones in livestock farming, except in limited circumstances, and an import 
prohibition on hormone-treated meat. 33 Despite attempts to address this dispute in informal 
25 These requirements were contained in the chapeau (headnote) of Article XX ofGATT 1947 (supra fn. 
6). They are now in the same article of GATT 1994. 
26 This requirement was contained in article XX(b) ofGATT 1947 (supra fn. 6). It is now in the same 
article of GATT 1994. 
27 See Thailand- Restrictions on the Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT B.I.S.D., 
31th Supp. 200, paras 74-81 (1991), 30 I.L.M. 1122 (1991) where it was held that the import restrictions on 
cigarettes were not justified by article XX(b) due to the availability of GA TT-consistent or less GATT-
inconsistent measures. 
28 Dale E. McNiel, "The first case under the WTO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement: the 
European Union's hormone ban." Virginia Journal of International Law 39 (1998): 89 at 94. 
29 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 1186 U.N.T.S. 276, GATT, B.I.S.D., 26th 
Supp. 8 (1980), adopted as part of the Tokyo Round negotiations [hereinafter referred to as the Standards 
Code]. 
30 Wirth, supra fn. IO at 822. 
31 Standards Code, supra fn. 29 article 14.9-14.12, Annex 2. 
32 This failure has been ascribed to the limited number of GATT contracting parties that subscribed to it 
as well as to the weakness of the dispute settlement mechanism under GATT 1947. See Atik. supra fn. 12 at 
741. 
33 Council Directive of 31 December 1985 Prohibiting the Use ifi Livestock Farming of Certain 
Substances having a Hormonal Action. 1985 O.J. (L.382) 228. See McNiel, (supra fn. 28 at 99-107) for details 
of the various EC Directives and proposals on this issue as well as this history of thi!i dispute. 
10 
discussions and later in dispute settlement proceedings under the Tokyo Round Standards 
Code, the conflict remained unresolved.34 
This inability of the existing agreements to deal effectively with this important dispute in the 
area of health protection was in the minds of the GA TT Contracting Parties when they met 
in Punta Del Este, Uruguay to launch the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. The agenda 
for the upcoming negotiations was set out in the Punta Del Este Declaration.35 This included 
the goals of continuing the liberalisation of world trade and extending the application of 
GA TT disciplines. Further, the Declaration called for bringing " ... all measures affecting 
import access ... under strengthened and more operationally active GA TT rules and 
disciplines" by, inter alia, "minimising the adverse effects that sanitary and phytosanitary 
regulations and barriers can have on trade in agriculture, taking into account the relevant 
international agreements." 36 Clearly the position of sanitary and phytosanitary measures37 
was seen as meriting special attention, apart from the larger genus of technical standards. 38 
This led to the drafting of two separate Agreements in the Uruguay Round. Firstly, the new 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade39 was established, applicable to technical 
regulations and standards other than sanitary or phytosanitary measures, which elaborated 
on the Tokyo Round Standards Code.40 Secondly, the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures was drawn up, in an attempt to provide an 
authoritative interpretation of article XX(b) that could set the limits of the use of health 
measures in ways that could affect international trade. 
34 After unsuccessful consultations on this dispute between the US and the EC, the US requested that the 
matter be referred to a technical expert group. The EC blocked the establishment of this expert group, so the 
dispute was not resolved. 
35 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round: Declaration of 20 September 1986, (hereinafter 
referred to as the Punta Del Este Declaration) Sept. 20, 1986, GATT B.I.S.D. (33rd Supp.) at 19 (1987). 
36 Punta Del Este Declaration, supra fn. 35 at 20. Quoted by McNiel supra fn. 28 at 95. 
37 Hereinafter referred to as SPS measures. 
38 Reasons that have been suggested for this view are the close link between agriculture and SPS 
standards, the importance of the beef hormone dispute and the fact that SPS measures were thought to raise 
problems different from those linked to other technical standards, for example the greater importance of 
scientific risk assessment, the greater divergence in national approaches to standard setting and the crucial role 
of national regulatory authorities in deciding on the need for regulation and the measures to be taken. See 
Wirth, supra fn. 10 at 824 and Eliza Patterson, "International efforts to minimize the adverse trade effects of 
national sanitary and phytosanitary regulations," Journal of World Trade 24 (1990): 91 at 95. 
39 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, in annex lA to the Marrakesh Agreement 
[hereinafter referred to as the TBT Agreement}. This Agreement replaces the Tokyo Round Standards Code of 
1980 (supra fn. 29). 
40 The TBT Agreement goes further than the Standards Code in that it applies to both mandatory 
standards and recommendations and extends not only lo products but also related processes and production 
methods. 
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The SPS Agreement lays down specific rules and disciplines applicable to SPS measures, 
as defined in an annex thereto. Going further than a mere elaboration and clarification of 
article XX(b) of GAIT 1994,41 the SPS Agreement established a new, comprehensive set of 
norms for the adoption, maintenance and enforcement of SPS measures. Unlike the new 
TBT Agreement, the SPS Agreement emphasises the role of scientific justification for the 
validity of national health measures. 
The SPS Agreement did not supplant the relevant provisions of the GAIT 1947 (now 
incorporated by reference in the GATT 1994) applicable to health measures. Instead the 
two agreements now operate in complement to each other and to the TBT Agreement. 
Thus, the current position of measures for the protection of public health under WTO law, 
is determined by the relevant provisions of these three agreements and their interpretation 
by the GATT/WTO Panels and the Appellate Body. 
This analysis will limit itself to an examination of the SPS Agreement. This seems logical as 
this Agreement is now the most important one in the area of public health in dispute 
settlement proceedings and thus has the greatest impact on national health measures. If, in 
a dispute settlement proceeding dealing with an SPS measure, the analysis started with the 
GA TT, it would nevertheless be necessary to subsequently examine the SPS Agreement for 
the following reasons: if a violation of GAIT (article Ill or XI) was fo1,.1nd, it would be 
necessary to determine whether this violation could be justified under art XX(b), and an 
SPS measure can now only be justified under art XX(b) if it does not violate the SPS 
Agreement. If, on the contrary, it were found that the measure did not violate GATT, this 
would not imply consistency with the SPS Agreement, as it contains a wider range of 
obligations and encompasses non-discriminatory measures, so it would have been 
necessary to consider the latter in any case. On the other hand, SPS measures which are 
consistent with the SPS Agreement are presumed in conformity with the relevant GA TT42 
and thus no furth~r analysis would be necessary once consistency with the SPS Agreement 
was shown.43 In cases where the contrary was found, the panel would still not have to 
proceed to an examination of GA TT-conformity since the invalidity of the measure is already 
established. 
41 Previously article XX(b) ofGATT 1947. 
42 SPS Agreement, (supra fit. 4) art. 2.4 states, "Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to 
the relevant provisions of this Agreement shall be presumed to be in accordance with the obligations of the 
Members under the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the use of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, in 
particular the provisions of article :XX(b)." 
43 David R. Hurst, "Hormones: European Communities - Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products," 
European Journal of International Law 9, no. 1 (1998): 1 at 3. 
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However, it must be borne in mind that the SPS Agreement does not apply to all measures 
for the protection of public health, but only those included in its definition of SPS measures. 
Other health measures must still be analysed in terms of the TBT Agreement and the 
relevant provisions of GA TT 1994. The provisions of these agreements are thus still 
relevant. As they do not address scientific analysis, however, they are outside the scope of 
this investigation. 
2.2 The SPS Agreement 
As mentioned above, talks on SPS measures in the Uruguay Round negotiations began as 
an attempt to elucidate the health exception in article XX(b) of the GA TT. By the time the 
SPS Agreement was completed, it had evolved into a complex range of disciplines including 
scientific justification, risk assessment, transparency and equivalency. It closed potential 
loopholes for protectionism while recognising the sovereign right of Member governments to 
make their own decisions regarding the levels of SPS protection in their countries. The SPS 
Agreement created the possibility for stricter scrutiny of domestic health regulations, 
tightening the existing exceptions in the GA TT 1994, by linking the validity of heath 
measures to scientific principles. 
2.2.1 Basic Rights and Duties 
Article 2 sets out the basic rights and obligations under the SPS Agreement, which are then 
further elaborated in subsequent articles. This article articulates the purpose of balancing 
the legitimate right of sovereign governments to take health protection measures, with the 
need to promote free trade and prevent protectionism. The core of this article is the use of 
science-based disciplines. 44 
Firstly, article 2.1 recognises the right of Members to take SPS measures necessary for the 
protection of human, plant or animal life or health, provided they conform to the provisions 
44 This article includes non-science disciplines as well. Article 2.3 lays down the requirements that SPS 
measures must not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between members where identical or similar 
conditions prevail, and that they must not be applied so as to constitute a disguised restriction on international 
trade. These requirements are drawn from the chapeau of article XX ofGATT 1994 (supra fn. 6). 
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of the SPS Agreement. Art 2.2 lays down three requirements for SPS measures: they must 
be (1) applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health 
(2) based on scientific principles; and (3) not maintained without sufficient scientific 
evidence, except as provided for in article 5.7. 
This core SPS provision establishes the role of science as a crucial part of the obligations 
undertaken by WTO Members in respect of SPS measures. Science is thus the touchstone 
against which measures are judged for validity. Once one recognises the fallacy inherent in 
a notion of universal science, it becomes necessary to ask: whose science must measures 
be tested against? Must the Panel defer to the choice of scientific approach made by the 
government imposing the measure, or can it substitute its own judgement for that of the 
government? In his statement when submitting the bill to implement the Uruguay Round 
Agreements, President Clinton claimed that the requirement of "sufficient scientific 
evidence'' does not authorise a Panel to substitute its judgement for that of the government 
imposing the measure. He stated that by requiring only sufficient scientific evidence, rather 
than a weighing of the preponderance of the evidence, this provision recognises the 
existence of scientific uncertainty and the fact that decisions are based on choices between 
differing scientific views. 45 This approach would leave the evaluation and choice between 
the different scientific views in the hands of the government imposing the measure, and 
would require Panels and the Appellate Body to defer to these decisions. This interpretation 
of article 2.2 was made by the US administration and is thus not an authoritative statement 
of the way the article will be applied by Panels or the Appellate Body. In fact, as will be seen 
in the following discussion, the positions taken by Panels and the Appellate Body to 
scientific evidence do not indicate such deference. On the contrary, the Member imposing 
the SPS measure must be able to offer evidence that would be acceptable to prominent 
scientists. 46 
In EC-Hormones, however, the issue of competing scientific opinions did not arise as there 
was unusually broad consensus among scientists that the use of hormones for growth-
promotion purposes, in accordance with good practice, is safe. A single scientist, Dr. Lucier, 
was of the opinion that using oestrogen for growth promotion could raise the risk of breast 
cancer by up to one in one million. His opinion was deemed, by the Panel and Appellate 
Body, to be of insufficient weight to overturn the contrary results of the studies referred to 
by the EC, as it was not the result of studies, carried out by him or under his supervision, 
45 Statement of Administrative Action. H.R Doc. 103-316, at 746 (quoted in McNiel, supra fn. 28 at 
ll8) [hereinafter, the SAA]. 
46 McNiel, supra fn. 28 at 118. 
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specifically focused on hormone residues in meat from cattle on which such hormones were 
used for growth promotion purposes. By implication therefore, if his opinion had been so 
based, it could have overturned the majority opinion. 
Article 2.2 does, in any event, still raise the question of the meaning of "sufficient scientific 
evidence", both in terms of the quantity of evidence required and its quality or scientific 
validity47. In EC-Hormones the EC argued that the word "sufficienf' refers to qualitative and 
not quantitative aspects of scientific evidence, just as the terms "risk" and "risk assessmenr 
are defined in qualitative terms. Thus, as long as the scientific support for the measure is 
valid, it need not be of a certain weight or embody a majority view. Further, the EC argued 
that the requirement that measures be based on "scientific principles" reinforces the notion 
that neither article 2.2 nor the SPS Agreement in general require that measures be based 
on best science or a preponderance of scientific evidence. Instead they merely require the 
existence of a scientific basis for the measure. This issue was not addressed in EC-
Hormones where the Panel found violations of articles 3 and 5 and thus did not consider it 
necessary to decide whether article 2 was violated also. The Appellate Body agreed with 
this application of judicial economy, but stated that it would have been more logical for the 
Panel to start by focusing on article 2 which sets out the basic rights and duties, before 
going on to article 5. It seems clear that if this issue had been decided, the Panel or 
Appellate Body would have found th~t there was not sufficient scientific evidence, since the 
EC measures at stake were adopted and maintained despite scientific proof that the use of 
the relevant hormones for growth promotion is safe when used in accordance with good 
practice. The use of judicial economy in this case to avoid deciding on this issue has been 
sharply criticised.48 It is argued that now neither the fact that the evidence overwhelmingly 
supports the safety of the product for human consumption, nor the total lack of scientific 
proof of a health risk is sufficient to guarantee a finding that there is a lack of "sufficient 
scientific evidence" of a health risk or that the measure is not "necessary'' to protect human 
health.49 
In Japan-Agricultural Products50 the Appellate Body addressed the meaning of "sufficient 
scientific evidence" in article 2.2. It held that sufficiency requires the existence of a sufficient 
br adequate relationship between two elements, here the SPS measure and the scientific 
47 
48 
49 
McNiel, supra. fn. 28 at 117. 
McNiel, supra fn. 28, at 134. 
McNiel, supra fn. 28, at 134. 
50 Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products WT/DS76/AB/R, 22 Feb. 1999 [hereinafter referred 
to as Japan-Agricultural Products]. 
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evidence.51 It based its finding on an analysis of articles 5.1, 3.3 and 5.7, which it saw as 
making up the context of article 2.2. Firstly, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that 
its finding in EC-Hormones regarding article 5.1, provides guidance for the interpretation of 
art 2.2.52 In the latter case it had held that the requirement in article 5.1 that a measure be 
"based on" a risk assessment, read together with art 2.2, means that there must be a 
rational relationship between the measure and the risk assessment. Secondly, the Appellate 
Body looked at article 3.3 which allows Members to introduce or maintain measures 
resulting in a higher level of protection than those based on the relevant international 
standard, inter a/ia if there is sufficient scientific justification. The Appellate Body held that 
there is sufficient scientific justification if there is a rational relationship between the 
measure and the available scientific information.53 Thirdly, the Appellate Body turned to 
article 5. 7, which allows Members to adopt provisional measures in case of insufficient 
scientific evidence. It held that this is a qualified exemption from article 2.2 and that a too-
broad interpretation of article 2.2 would render it meaningless.54 
The Appellate Body concluded, in the light of these considerations, that article 2.2 requires 
that there be a rational or objective relationship between the measure and the scientific 
evidence, which must be determined on a case by case basis and depends on the 
circumstances of the case, including the quantity and quality of scientific evidence.55 
This "rational relationship-test" is far from laying down clear guidelines on what will be 
regarded as sufficient scientific evidence. By leaving a wide discretion to the Panel or 
Appellate Body to make ad hoc decisions based on their evaluation of the circumstances of 
the case, it explicitly leaves open the possibility that the Panel or Appellate Body cot,Jld 
evaluate the quality or weight of the scientific evidence presented, a task for which these 
bodies which are primarily composed of trade experts, are not qualified.56 From this decision 
it is thus not clear that the deference to national scientific judgements claimed by President 
Clinton in the SAA will actually be accorded by the Panel or Appellate Body.57 
It is recommended that a Panel should limit its enquiry to the question whether there is 
scientific consensus or scientific uncertainty regarding the issue at hand. Scientific 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
Japan-Agricultural Products, supra fit. 50 at para. 73. 
Japan-Agricultural Products, supra fit. 50 at para. 76. 
Japan-Agricultural Products, supra fit. 50 at para. 79. 
Japan-Agricultural Products, supra fn. 50 at para. 80. 
Japan-Agricultural Products, supra fn. 50 at para. 84. 
The issue of the compositipn of the Panels is discussed further in Section 3.2 below. 
See the discussion on the standard of review, in Section 3.5 below. 
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uncertainty is most often the case and is evinced by the presence of a good faith difference 
of opinion among scientists. In such cases, a Panel should determine which of the 
alternative accounts are found plausible by scientists and which are not. If there is any 
reputable scientific support for the Member's measure, it should be held to be based on 
"sufficient scientific evidence".58 
Another important issue raised in this case was that of the applicability of what is known as 
the precautionary principle, under the SPS Agreement.59 This principle has gained wide 
acceptance on international level,60 in response to the increasing realisation of scientific 
uncertainty. According to the precautionary principle, in cases where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason 
for postponing measures to prevent such damage. 61 Japan's argument in this case that 
article 2.2 must be interpreted in the tight of the precautionary principle, was rejected by the 
Appellate Body62 which referred back to its decision on this point in EC-Hormones.63 In the 
latter case, the Appellate Body felt unqualified to decide whether the precautionary principle 
now forms part of customary international law. However, it held that even if this were the 
case, the specific agreement on rules for cases of scientific uncertainty in article 5. 7 of the 
SPS Agreement overrides any such general principle. Thus the precautionary principle 
cannot be used to justify an otherwise inconsistent measure except to the extent provided 
for in article 5.7.64 The Appellate Body did, however, recognise that a Panel evaluating the 
question whether "sufficient scientific evidence" exists should bear in mind that "responsible, 
representative governments commonly act from perspectives of prudence and precaution 
where risks are irreversible, e.g. life-terminating, damage to human health are concerned."65 
This does not sufficiently take into account the precautionary principle, however.66 
58 Walker, supra fn. 13 at 280. 
59 For further discussion of the role of the precautionary principle in the SPS Agreement, see Wirth, 
(supra fn. 10) at 838-40. 
60 The precautionary principle is recognised in the following international instruments amongst others: 
the Treaty of Rome, as amended by the Single European Act (1987 O.J. Ll69 in art. 12), the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (1992 31 I.L.M. 849 in art. 3.3), and the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development (1992 31 l.L.M. 876 in Principle 15). 
61 This definition was adapted from the one appearing in the Rio Declaration (supra fn. 60) at 879. 
62 Japan-Agricultural Products, supra fn. 50 at para. 81. 
63 Appellate Body Report: European Communities- Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones) WT/DS26/ AB/R, 16 Jan. 1998, [hereinafter referred to as EC-Hormones] at para. 125. 
64 The question whether article 5. 7 deals adequately with the issue of lack of certainty in science will be 
discussed in Section 2.2.4 hereunder. 
65 EC-Hormones, supra fn. 63 para. 124. 
66 Under the points for negotiation raised in the Millennium Round trade negotiations (supra fn. 3) is the 
need to strengthen the precautionary principle in the SPS Agreement, as art. 5. 7 does not go far enough in 
recognising this principle. 
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This decision applies not only to the interpretation of article 2.2, but to all the science-based 
rules in the SPS Agreement. When one bears in mind the pervasiveness of uncertainty in 
scientific analysis and the influence of this factor on most risk assessments and other 
scientific aspects of the regulatory process, it seems at odds with reality to confine its 
recognition to a single article providing for temporary measures.67 
2.2.2 Harmonisation around International Standards 
In the preamble of the SPS Agreement, one of the aims expressed is the promotion of the 
use of harmonised SPS measures by Members, based on international standards 
developed by the relevant international organisations,68 without requiring Members to 
change their appropriate level of protection. 
The SPS Agreement thus attempts to balance the aim of increasing free trade through 
harmonising SPS measures and thus reducing the trade barriers caused by differing 
standards, with respect for the right of Members to choose their own level of protection. 
Thus harmonisation around international standards is encouraged by means of a 
presumption of consistency with GA TI 1994 and the SPS Agreement, but it is not actually 
mandated even where global standards would be most trade efficient. This is in tune with 
the fact that the choice of a level of protection is viewed as a sovereign decision and 
accorded substantial deference in the SPS Agreement. Thus a government is not obliged to 
accept an international standard that leads to a level of health protection lower than that 
which it has established to be appropriate. This strategy is embodied in Article 3 of the SPS 
Agreement. 
As the WTO is not a regulatory body with norm-setting capacity, it does not set the 
standards itself, but relies on those set by the international organisations listed in Annex A, 
paragraph 3, namely Codex Alimentarius, the International Office of Epizootics, the 
Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention and other international 
organisations open for membership to all WTO Members as identified by the Committee on 
67 Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement will be discussed in Section 2.2.4. 
68 The SPS Agreement lists several relevant international organizations in article 3.4. The most 
important of these in the area of health is the Codex Alimentarius Commission, which was established in 1962. 
This Commission has as its aim the protection of consumer health as well as ensuring fair practices in the food 
trade. (See the Statutes of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, article La). The Commission has the mandate 
to adopt voluntary multilateral good practice standards on issues such as labelling, food processing techniques, 
the composition of food products, food additives and inspection procedures. 
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SPS Measures. Members are obliged under article 3.4 to participate in the work of these 
organisations, to the extent that their reso~rces permit, and to promote development and 
periodic review of SPS standards. 
The specific provisions of article 3 and their interpretation by the Appellate Body deserve 
particular attention here, as they provide a good illustration of the use of science in the 
policing of national regulation. Article 3.1 expresses the aim of harmonising SPS measures 
on as wide a basis as possible, and states the obligation of Members to "base" their SPS 
measures on international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist, 
except as provided for in article 3.3. Art 3.2 creates a presumption of consistency with 
GA TT 1994 and the SPS Agreement for measures which "conform to" international 
standards. These measures are also deemed to meet the requirement of being necessary 
for the protection of human, animal of plant life or health. Article 3.3 recognises the right of 
Members to use SPS measures which result in a higher level of protection than would be 
achieved by measures "based on" the relevant international standards and sets certain 
requirements for this. The various options open for Members under these provisions were 
identified by the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones. It rejected the Panel's approach of 
seeing articles 3.1 and 3.2 as the general rule and article 3.3 as the exception. 69 Instead it 
identified three options available to Members under these provisions. 
Firstly, Members may choose under article 3.1 to base their SPS measures on international 
standards. In EC-Hormones the meaning of "based on" in article 3.1 was addressed. The 
Panel had held that article 3. 1 does not define "based on" but that article 3.2 equates 
measures "based on" international standards with those which "conform to" these 
standards. It had also held that to be "based on" an international standard, the measure 
must achieve the same level of sanitary protection as that standard, a conclusion implied by 
article 3.3. The Appellate Body rejected this reasoning, finding that the plain meaning of the 
terms "based on" and "conform to" differ. 70 Whereas a thing is based on another if it is 
founded or built upon it, it only CQnforms to the latter if it corresponds with it in form or 
manner. Therefore a measure "based on" an international standard might incorporate some 
but not all elements of the international standard and thus not "conform to" that standard. 
The Appellate Body also pointed out that the Panel's interpretation was contrary to the 
Object of article 3, which sets the harmonisation around international standards as a goal to 
be achieved in the future, not as a current obligation on Members. However, the Appellate 
69 
70 
EC-Hormones, supra fn. 63, para. 168. 
EC-Hormones, supra fn. 63, para. 163-166. 
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Body did not proceed to examine whether, in this case, the measure adopted any elements 
of the existing international standard set by Codex Alimentarius. It appears to have 
assumed that this was not the case, as it continued by analysing the measure under the 
requirements of article 3.3 for measures which are not based on international standards.71 
The Appellate Body also refrained from deciding on the correctness of the rest of the 
Panel's analysis on this point. It would appear that the Panel was correct in informing the 
term "based on" in article 3.1 with reference to the use of the same term in article 3.3. Thus 
in order to be regarded as "based on" an international standard, the SPS measure must 
result in the same level of protection, besides adopting at least some of the elements of the 
international standard. 72 If it is not "based on" the international standard, it must then meet 
the requirements of article 3.3. 
The question arises whether article 3 obliges Members to maintain at least the minimum 
level of health protection that is reflected in relevant international standards, while allowing 
higher, but not lower, levels of protection. This would seem to be the case from an 
examination of the words of the relevant provisions, since a Member is obliged to adopt 
measures which are "based on" international standards, that is, achieving the same level of 
protection, unless the provisions of article 3.3 are complied with. The latter article allows 
SPS measures resulting in a higher level of protection in certain conditions. Nowhere are 
measures aimed at a lower level of protection mentioned. It has been argued that a 
measure should not be analysed under article 3.3 simply because the Member imposing it 
claims that the measure achieves a higher level of protection than the international 
standard. 73 In EC-Hormones the EC did not actually prove that its challenged measure 
resulted in a higher level of protection. 74 Still, the Appellate Body went on to examine its 
measure under article 3.3. It seems unlikely that a positive obligation of a certain minimum 
level of health protection was intended or would be accepted by WTO Members. Further, it 
is hard to imagine one Member challenging another for having a too low level of health 
protection for its own citizens. 
71 
72 
73 
EC-Hormones, supra fu. 63, para. 176-177. 
EC-Hormones, supra fu. 63, para. 171. 
McNiel, supra fu. 28 at 126. 
74 This is so because the scientific evidence did not establish that the hormones at issue posed any health 
risk at all, so the EC's measure cannot be said to achieve a higher level of protection. The Panel simply 
assumed, for the purpose of analysis, that the EC' s chosen level of protection would be higher than the level 
achieved by the relevant Codex standards, and the Appellate Body stated that it agreed with the Panel's finding 
that this was so. However, it is clear that the Panel did not make such a finding. See McNiel, supra fu. 28 at 
126. 
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A further question which arises regards the consequences of choosing the option under 
article 3.1. Clearly the Member which merely bases its SPS measures on international 
standards, without conforming to them, does not enjoy a presumption of compliance of its 
measures with the SPS Agreement and GA TI 1994. Still, it seems logical that there should 
be an advantage over the situation under article 3.3. It has been argued75 that as a 
measure based on an international standard is automatically based on a risk assessment 
(that conducted by the relevant international organisation). the measure need not comply 
with article 5.1-5.3. 
The second option a Member has is to choose to establish an SPS measure which 
conforms to the relevant international standard. The measure must then completely embody 
the international standard. The SPS Agreement promotes such measures by granting them 
a presumption of consistency with the SPS Agreement and GA TI 1994. However, this 
presumption was held to be rebuttable in EC-Hormones. 16 One could question the real 
benefit of such a presumption for the defending Member since, in any case, the burden of 
proving a violation of GA TI or the SPS Agreement would rest on the challenging Member, 
even in the absence of this presumption. A Member is always presumed to be in 
compliance with its obligations until a prima facie case to the contrary is shown by the 
complaining Member. The efficacy of this provision in promoting adherence to international 
standards is thus doubtful. 
It has been argued that the fact that a measure that is in accordance with international 
standards enjoys a presumption of validity, increases the importance of standard setting on 
international level. This is relevant as the distribution of power here is different than on 
national level as certain interests, like consumer or environmental groups, are 
underrepresented while others, such as producers, have a lot of influence77. Once it is 
recognised that the scientific process, on which the standard-setting activities of 
international organisations are based, rests on assumptions which fill gaps in scientific 
knowledge, it is easy to see that the bias in these assumptions will result in standards that 
favour producers rath~r than consumers. 
The third option open to Members is to promulgate SPS measures providing a higher level 
of protection than would measures "based on" the relevant standards. This provision 
recognises the rights of Members to choose their own level of protection, an important 
75 
76 
77 
Hurst, supra fn. 43, at 8. 
EC-Hormones, supra fn. 63 at para. 170. 
Atik, supra fn. 12 at 744. 
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principle in the SPS Agreement. The Appellate Body held in EC-Hormones that this is an 
autonomous right and not an exception to article 3.1. Thus the burden of proof regarding 
compliance with article 3.3 does not shift to the defendant Member and there is no 
"punishment" for Members choosing to follow this option. 
However, this is not an unqualified right and two science-related conditions are set in the 
alternative. Either there must be a scientific justification for the measures, or they must be 
the result of the higher level of protection chosen by the Member in accordance with article 
5.1-5.8. In both cases the measures must be consistent with all other provisions of the SPS 
Agreement. 
The distinction made in article 3.3 between these two possible situations creates problems 
of interpretation. In EC-Hormones the EC argued that there was a "scientific justification" for 
its measure, so it need not be in accordance with article 5.1-5.8, which requirement is set 
for the second situation only. It thus claimed that no risk assessment was required as a 
basis for its ban on hormone-treated beef. The Appellate Body held that the distinction 
between the two situations identified in article 3.3, is more apparent than real. 78 In fact both 
situations require a risk assessment in accordance with article 5. The Appellate Body based 
its finding on two facts. Firstly, the last sentence of article 3.3 requires that in both 
situations, measures be consistent with all the provisions of the SPS Agreement, thus 
including article 5. Secondly, the footnote to art 3.3, 79 attacheq to the end of the first 
sentence, defines scientific justification as an "examination and evaluation of available 
scientific information in conformity with the relevant provisions of this Agreement. .. ". 80 This 
appears to be of the nature of a risk assessment as required in art 5.1 and defined in Annex 
A, paragraph 4. Thus this ruling should be taken as requiring that a Member claiming 
scientific justification for its deviation from international standards, must base such a claim 
on a valid risk assessment. 81 The Appellate Body went on to point out that the article 5 was 
meant as a counterbalance to the Members' right to choose their own level of protection.82 
78 EC-Hormones, supra fu. 63 at para. 175. 
79 Note 2 to SPS Agreement article 3.3 reads: "For the purposes of paragraph 3 of Article 3, there is 
sufficient scientific justification if, on the baSis of an examination and evaluation of available scientific 
information in conformity with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, a Member determines that the 
relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations are not sufficient to achieve its appropriate 
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection." 
80 This definition was inserted after the controversy surrounding the use of the term "scientific 
justification" in the Dunkel Draft (an interim negotiating text of the Uruguay Round, 20 Dec., 1991, GATT 
Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA) due to fears that this term could be interpreted to require a strict cause-and-effect link 
between the SPS measure adopted and empirical scientific data. 
81 McNiel, supra fn. 28 at 126. 
82 EC-Hormones, supra fu. 63 at para. 177. 
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Thus the requirements of a risk assessment in article 5.1 and of sufficient scientific 
evidence in article 2.3 are crucial in maintaining the balance between the competing 
interests of trade liberalisation and the protection of health. The role of science as the scale 
on which these interests are balanced is striking in this interpretation of this provision. 
It has been argued that the reason behind distinguishing between the two different 
situations is to emphasise the difference in the scope of review in each case. 83 The first 
situation deals with the Member's judgement, on the basis of scientific information, 
regarding the adequacy of international standards to meet its level of protection. This could, 
for example, be the case where, due to local peculiarities, the international standard is 
ineffective in securing the level of health protection it was aimed at. 84 The second situation 
deals with the choice of a different level of protection by a Member, which is a policy choice. 
One could thus speak of a scientific justification and a policy justification. 85 Scientific 
justifications could be more rigorously reviewed than policy ones and thus harmonisation of 
the former more vigorously promoted than of the latter. 86 
What is clear from an examination of this harmonisation provision in the SPS Agreement, is 
the role of science, in the form of scientific justification or risk assessment, in providing 
norms or rules. Free trade necessitates harmonised health standards in order to do away 
with the barriers created by disparate requirements in various countries. However, the lack 
of a rule-making body in the WTO to take on the task of providing generally applicable 
health standards87 creates an institutional gap. Article 3 attempts to fill this gap by making 
use of another, universally accepted and thus authoritative provider of uniform standards, 
namely science. Where a large degree of scientific consensus exists, as embodied in 
standards set by international organisations, 88 Members are encouraged to use these 
83 Walker, supra fn. 13 at 275-6. 
84 See Panel Report: European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) 
- Complaint by Canada, WT/DS26/R/CAN, 18 Aug. 1997 [hereinafter referred to as EC-Hormones Panel 
Report] at para. 8.84. Here the Panel stated that both Canada and the EC interpreted the first situation as 
existing where the relevant international standard is outdated, inadequate, faulty or obsolete from a scientific 
perspective, for example where it in fact does not provide the level of protection it was intended to provide. 
85 On the contrary, see Wirth (supra fn. 10, at 827), where he argues that the footnote explaining the 
meaning of "scientific justification" might be taken to mean that there are scientific constraints on the choice of 
the appropriate level of protection. However, it seems rather that the scientific analysis mandated by that 
footnote is directed at the question of whether the international standards are effective in achieving the 
Member's chosen level of protection, rather than at the choice of appropriate level itself. 
86 Walker, supra fn. 13 at 275-6. 
87 Unlike the situation which exists in the EU, where negative integration (lowering of trade barriers) is 
accompanied by positive integration (setting of general norms or rules). This is possible due to the norm-setting 
capacity of the EU institutions, which can operate on a supranational level, a characteristic which is absent in 
theWTO. 
88 The Secretariat of the Codex Alimentarius Commission released a paper on the role of science in the 
Codex decision-making process. See Codex Alimentarius Doc. CX/GP 94/4. 
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standards. In the alternative, where no such standards exist or where Members wish to 
deviate from these standards, scientific justifications operate to generate norms and rules. 89 
The reason for this approach is the fact that science is seen to be a universal body of 
knowledge, based on physical experience and neutral and thus valid for all. Therefore, the 
results of testing national regulations against the dictates of science, would hopefully result 
in greater uniformity of health measures by promoting gradual regulatory convergence 
across national borders. 
While this would be the case if science were really universal and absolute, the fact of the 
matter is that the lack of consensus that exists among scientists as to the true state of 
scientific knowledge makes it not only an unreliable tool to use in judging the validity of 
national regulations, but also one unlikely to lead to greater uniformity in national health 
measures. 
2.2.3 Risk Assessment and the Determination of an Appropriate Level of Protection 
Article 5 deals mainly with two issues of particular importance to the role o( scientific 
analysis in policing national health regulations, namely the distinction between risk 
assessment and risk management: paragraphs 1-3 deal with risk assessment and 
paragraphs 4-6 with the determination of an appropriate level of SPS protection, which is a 
risk management decision. Further paragraph 7 provides for the provisional adoption of 
SPS measures, where there is insufficient scientific evidence. 
2.2.3.1 Risk Assessment 
(i) Definition 
Paragraph 4 of Annex A to the SPS Agreement defines two types of risk assessment. The 
first type is the evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or 
disease in the territory of the importing Member, according to the SPS measures that could 
be applied, and of the associated potential biological and economic consequences, and the 
second one is the evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on human or animal health 
89 Atik, supra fu. 12 at 739. 
24 
due to the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or disease causing organisms in 
food, beverages or feedstuffs. 
The Appellate Body examined these definitions in two cases. In EC-Hormones,90 the 
second type of risk assessment was at issue. The Panel had held that there were two steps 
to this kind of risk assessment, namely the identification of the adverse effects of the 
hormones and, if such effects exist, the evaluation of the potential or probability of their 
occurrence. 91 The Appellate Body did not take issue with the two step test, but regarded the 
Panel's use of probability as an alternative for potential as cause for concern as ttie word 
implies a higher degree of potentiality and seems to introduce a quantitative element. 92 The 
Appellate Body also looked at the Panel's use of the terms "identifiable risk" and 
"scientifically identified risk". To the extent that the phrases were used in the sense that 
theoretical uncertainty is not the kind of risk to be assessed under article 5.1, the Appellate 
Body agreed with the Panel. 93 Thus there must be proof of an actual risk, not just 
uncertainty about whether there is a risk or not. However, where the Panel used the terms 
to imply that article 5.1 requires a certain magnitude of risk, the Appellate Body noted that 
this quantitative requirement has no basis in the SPS Agreement. A Panel must only 
determine whether the measure is sufficiently supported or reasonably warranted by the risk 
assessment.94 Further, the Appellate Body stated that the risk assessment may go beyond 
the controlled conditions in a scientific laboratory, and take account of the actual potential 
for adverse effects in the real world.95 
In Australia-Salmon,96 the first type of risk assessment was relevant. The Appellate Body 
held that this type of risk assessment must fulfil three requirements. 97 First, it must identify 
the diseases whose entry, establishment or spread the member wishes to prevent, as well 
as the potential biological and economic consequences associated therewith. Second, it 
must evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases and their 
consequences. Third, this likelihood must be evaluated according to the SPS measures that 
might be applied. In Japan-Agricultural Products the Appellate Body once again affirmed 
these requirements and found that a risk assessment, which Japan argued it had based its 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
EC-Hormones, supra fn. 63. 
EC-Hormones, Panel Report, supra fn. 84 at para. 8.98. 
EC-Hormones, supra fn. 63 at para. 184-186. 
EC-Hormones, supra fn. 63 at para. 186. 
EC-Hormones, supra fn. 63 at para. 186. 
EC-Hormones, supra fn. 63 para. 187. 
96 Australia- Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon WT/DS 18/ AB/B, 20 Oct. 1998 [hereinafter 
referred to as Australia-Salmon]. 
97 Australia-Salmon, supra fn. 96, at para. 121. 
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measure on, did not refer to any SPS measure which could be taken to reduce the risk, and 
thus did not comply with the third requirement. 98 
In Australia-Salmon, 99 the Appellate Body also pointed to the different language used in the 
first and second definitions of risk assessment. While the second calls for an evaluation of 
the "potential" for adverse effects, the first requires the evaluation of the "likelihood" of 
entry, establishment or spread of pests or diseases. The Appellate Body held that 
likelihood means the same as probability, thus more is needed than to show a possibility or 
"some likelihood" of entry, establishment or spread. 100 It thus seems that what the 
probability actually is must be established. Australia's evaluation of the probability as "low" 
or "small" was not deemed sufficieht. Further, the Appellate Body found that the existence 
of unknown or uncertain elements does not justify a departure from the requirements of 
article 5.1-5.3. 101 The usefulness of the determination of probability is doubtful, since no 
matter what the probability of the risk occurring is, the state is free to set its own level of 
protection. One could also question what the purpose of this distinction between the two 
definitions is and whether it was intended by the drafters of the Agreement, since both 
types of risk assessment are aimed at determining the existence of equally important 
threats to health. 
While in EC-Hormones the Appellate Body had expressed concern that the term 
"probability" might introduce a quantitative element into the second definition, in Australia-
Salmon102 it found that likelihood or probability in the first definition could be expressed 
quantitatively or qualitatively and confirmed the finding in EC-Hormones that the risk 
assessment need not establish a certain magnitude or threshold level of risk. However, this 
does not go far enough in recognising the nature of risk. By insisting on proof of probability, 
the Appellate Body ignores the fact that risk is not only found in actual knowledge of a 
certain likelihood of harm, but also in the lack of knowledge about a possible hazard. 103 
The Appellate Body in this case 104 distinguished between the evaluation of risk, which must 
show an ascertainable risk, not just a theoretical uncertainty, and the determination of an 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
Japan-Agricultural Products, supra fn. 50, at para. 113. 
Australia-Salmon, supra fn. 96, at para 123 and fn. 69. 
Australia-Salmon, supra fn. 96, at para 124. 
Australia-Salmon, supra fn. 96, at para 130. 
Australia-Salmon, supra fn. 96, at para 124. 
Walker, supra fn. 13, at 305. He states that: "On the continuum between a merely speculative risk and 
a conclusively demonstrated one lies a vast stretch of undemonstrated, unquantified, but scientifically plausible 
risks. Within that zone, the risk of harm is real so long as safety is unproven." 
104 Australia-Salmon, supra fn. 96, at para 125. 
103 
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appropriate level of protection, which may be premised on a zero risk level. It is thus 
possible for a Member, once an actual risk, however small, has been proven to have a 
certain probability, to choose a zero risk level of protection and institute SPS measures to 
achieve this level. As mentioned previously, this distinction is often referred to as the 
difference between risk assessment (the science-based process of determining the 
existence of a risk and the likelihood of it occurring according to the SPS measures which 
could be applied), and risk management (a policy-based choice of the level of protection 
deemed appropriate by a state, taking into account various social value judgements such as 
the citizens' tolerance of risk, economic considerations, etcetera). 105 While a Member's risk 
assessment must thus be founded on scientific analysis, more scope is left for risk 
management decisions in the setting of an appropriate level of protection. This distinction 
was recognised by the Panel in EC-Hormones. 106 It used this distinction to exclude from the 
scope of a risk assessment certain non-scientific reports and opinions of the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, which evaluated reports submitted to 
them, as well as the question of risks associated with the problem of control of thEt use of 
hormones. It viewed these issues as having to do with social value judgements and thus as 
not scientifically based. The Appellate Body rejected the Panel's distinction, stating that the 
SPS Agreement nowhere refers to the term "risk management" but only to "risk 
assessment". 107 Thus the Panel's use of the distinction to limit the scope of what falls under 
risk assessment, was held to have no basis in the text. 
While it is true that the term "risk management" is not explicitly mentioned in the SPS 
Agreement, this document clearly deals in different ways with the Members' obligation to 
base their SPS measures on a risk assessment and their right to establish their own level of 
protection. The former is subject to strict scientific criteria, whereas the latter choice is not 
reviewable, provided it takes into account the aim of reducing negative trade effects when 
determining the appropriate level of protection 108 and avoids arbitrary or unjustifiable 
distinctions in the levels of protection it sets in different situations. 109 The criteria for validity 
of the choice of level of protection do not have a scientific basis. This recognises the 
sovereign right of Members to make their own policy choices in the area of public health, 
taking into account various non-scientific considerations. The choice is ultimately one based 
on societal value judgements. The latter area of decision-making is commonly known as risk 
management. 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
For a more detailed analysis of this distinction, see Walker, supra fn. 13. 
EC-Hormones Panel Report, supra fn. 84 at para. 8.98. 
EC-Hormones, supra fn. 63, para. 181. 
SPS Agreement, supra fn. 4, art. 5.4. 
SPS Agreement, supra fn. 4, art. 5.5. 
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It would perhaps have made more sense for the Appellate Body to take issue with the 
Panel's classification of the risks of control as non-scientific and thus as not forming part of 
a risk assessment, rather than denying the de facto different treatment of risk assessment 
and risk management in the SPS Agreement. The Appellate Body partially recognised this 
when it overruled the Panel's decision that risks from failure to observe good veterinary 
practice and problems relating to detection and control of such failure must be rejected a 
priori because they are unscientific and thus do not fall within article 5.2. The Appellate 
Body found th~t the Panel had misinterpreted the scope of article 5.2 and that these 
considerations did, in fact, belong thereunder.110 
It would appear that the Appellate Body's approach that the risks assessed under both 
definitions need not be identifiable or quantifiable, and the risks may be other than those 
that can be scientifically determined in a laboratory, together wit.h its denial of the role of risk 
management under the SPS Agreement, may open the door for the inclusion of non-
scientific factors within risk assessment and thus recognise the role of science policy. Thus, 
considerations normally forming part of risk management decisions could now be included 
under risk assessment.111 It has been argued that this development should be approach~d 
with caution, as it would be disastrous to allow risk assessments to be based on pure 
emotion, such as the risk of public hysteria, fears of genetically modified foods etcetera. 112 
However, it seems unlikely that such factors could be incorporated into the strict definition 
of risk assessment. Instead, it seems that the Appellate Body's holdings are an attempt to 
take into account factors that are not capable of strict quantifiable analysis, but nonetheless 
present a real risk for health. This should be seen as a positive development, although it 
stops short of explicitly recognising the role of science policy in risk assessment, as distinct 
from risk management decisions. 
(ii) Requirement that measures be "based on" the risk assessment 
Art 5.1 sets the requirement that SPS measures be "based on" an assessment of the risks 
to human, animal or plant life or health. The meaning of "based on" was discussed in EC-
Horrnones.113 In this case the Panel had read a procedural requirement into the term, 
110 
Ill 
EC-Hormones, supra fn. 63, para. 187. 
Walker, supra fn. 13, at 304. 
112 Warren H. Maruyama, "A new pillar of the WTO: Sound science," The International Lawyer 32 
(1998): 651at672. 
113 EC-Hormones, supra fn. 63, para. 188-209. 
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obliging Members to actually take a risk assessment into account when enacting or 
maintaining SPS measures. It looked to preambles of EC Directives for evidence that this 
was in fact done. 114 The Appellate Body rejected this subjective requirement as having no 
basis in the text. Instead it held that the term "based on" refers to an objective relationship 
between the measure and the risk assessment. The Appellate Body noted that article 5.1 
does not require a Member to conduct its own risk assessment. Instead Members may 
base their measures on other relevant assessments. 115 The Panel's interpretation could 
lead to the disregard of existing scientific evidence that supports the measure.116 The 
Appellate Body also rejected the use of preambles as evidence as they are not required by 
the SPS Agreement and are not normally used to show that a Member has complied with its 
international obligations. 
The Panel had also found that article 5.1 contained a substantive requirement, namely that 
the scientific conclusions reached in the risk assessment and those implicit in the SPS 
measure should conform. 117 The Appellate Body agreed with the relevance of the 
relationship between the two sets of conclusions, but emphasised that this is only one of 
the relevant factors. It held that " based on" sets the substantive requirement that there 
must be a rational relationship between the measure and the risk assessment. In other 
words, the measure must be sufficiently supported or reasonably warranted by the risk 
assessment. 118 This does not mean that the risk assessment must come to a single 
conclusion, reflected in the measures adopted. It may embody divergent opinions. The 
Appellate Body recognised that responsible governments may in good faith adopt measures 
based on divergent opinions from qualified and respected sources, without this negating the 
existence of a rational relationship. It proposed an ad hoc approach to the determination of 
the existence of a rational relationship. 119 This conclusion has been criticised for leaving 
intact the issue of duelling science and opening the door for the use of "hired scientists" in 
future dispute settlement cases. 120 However, it should be recognised that this is the only 
realistic approach which could be taken in the light of the lack of consensus that exists 
within the scientific community. 
114 EC-Hormones Panel Report, supra fn. 84, para. 8.116-8.119. 
115 EC-Hormones, supra fn. 63, para 190. However, the Appellate Body did require that proof that a risk 
assessment supporting the measure does exist, be produced at dispute-settlement proceedings. 
116 EC-Hormones, supra fn. 63, para. 189-190. 
117 EC 
118 
119 
120 
-Hormones Panel Report, supra fn. 84, para 8.120. 
EC-Hormones, supra fn. 63, para. 193. 
EC-Hormones, supra fn. 63, para. 194. 
McNiel, supra fn. 28, at 134. 
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This still leaves considerable scope for interpretation as to what kind of relationship would 
be considered rational. Would a measure based on a single divergent scientific opinion be 
considered rationally related to the risk assessment? What is clear from this case is that for 
a risk assessment to be considered to rationally support a measure, it must be sufficiently 
specific.121 The EC had conducted studies showing that the use of the relevant hormones 
(except MGA for which no studies were available) for growth-promotion purposes was safe. 
It had also submitted studies showing a general risk of cancer from hormones but not 
focusing specifically on the carcinogenic potential of residues of the relevant hormones in 
beef when used for growth-promotion purposes These reports were found to be 
insufficiently specific to form a rational basis for the measures. It would thus seem that it 
would be sufficient if the EC in the EC-Hormones dispute were to have found a single 
scientist willing to report that human consumption of beef treated with hormones for growth-
promotion purposes poses a real ri$k of cancer. Thus would seem to frustrate the SPS 
Agreement's goal of using science to create clear rules and discipHnes.122 On the other 
hand, to do otherwise would be to deny the reality of diverging scientific opinions. The 
creation of clear rules would not truly serve the end of achieving economic efficiency unless 
the rules were a scientifically accurate reflection of the risks, costs and benefits involved. 
While there is still no definite scientific answer to these questions, Members should be free 
to choose among plausible alternatives, rather than have the WTO impose the views of a 
single group of scientists on all its Members.123 Thus, it is better for WTO panels to limit their 
enquiries to the question of the reasonableness or plausibility of Members' risk assessment 
decisions. 
(iii) Relevant Factors 
Although the SPS Agreement does not specify a methodology to be used in making a risk 
assessment, it does list the scientific and economic factors which Members must take into 
account, in article 5.2 and 5.3. 
Firstly, article 5.2 proyides that Members must take certain scientific factors into account 
when assessing risks. These are: available scientific evidence, relevant processes and 
production methods, relevant inspection sampling and testing methods, prevalence of 
specific diseases or pests, existence of pest- or disease-free areas, relevant ecological and 
121 
122 
EC-Hormones, supra fn. 63, para. 198-200. 
McNiel, supra fn. 28 at 93. 
123 Walker, supra fn. 13, at 281. Walker also lists other reasons why the WTO should refrain from 
interfering in Members' science-policy choices. 
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environmental conditions, and quarantine or other treatment. As stated above, the Panel in 
EC-Hormones had held that the risks relating to detection and control of failure to observe 
good veterinary practice should be excluded from risk assessment a priori because they are 
non-scientific and thus do not fall within the scope of article 5.2's provision on "relevant 
inspection sampling and testing methods", but rather are taken into account in risk 
management. The Appellate Body rejected this finding, holding that the scope of article 5.2 
allowed the taking into account of these risks. It held that the SPS Agreement requires an 
assessment of the potential for adverse effects on human health from contaminants or 
toxins in food and that the object and purpose of the Agreement justify the assessment of 
such risks, regardless of their origin. Whether such a risk must be examined should be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, and it should not be excluded a priori. The Appellate 
Body further rejected the risk assessmenUrisk management distinction made by the Panel, 
holding that it has no basis in the text of the SPS Agreement. As discussed above, it is 
debatable whether the denial of this distinction is correct, provided that certain risks are not 
artificially excluded for the scope of risk assessment. 
Article 5.3 sets out certain economic factors to be taken into account in assessing risks to 
animal or plant (not human) life or health and in determining which SPS measure should be 
applied124. This implies a recognition of the fact that risk assessments are not purely 
science-based but involve economic considerations as well. 
2.2.3.2 Appropriate Level of Protection 
Once it is established that there is scientific evidence of risk, Members are free to choose 
their own appropriate level of protection. The choice of a particular level of protection is 
what is typically called a risk management decision. Such decisions are taken by national 
administrations on the basis of societal value judgements, not purely on the basis of 
scientific analysis. In other words, once it has scientifically been established that a health 
risk exists and what the magnitude of that risk is, by means of a risk assessment, other 
policy issues come into play. SPS measures seldom have the protection of health as their 
sole objective. Instead several other significant factors are incorporated into the decision. 
One such factor may be the tolerance of consumers in that country for a particular type of 
risk. Another might be economic efficiency. The decision is at core a political one, reflecting 
124 These are " the potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales in the event of entry, 
establishment or spread of a pest or disease; the costs of control or eradication in the territory of the importing 
Member; and the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risks" SPS Agreement supra 
fn. 4, art. 5.3. 
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societal value choices. The SPS Agreement recognises this, by placing no requirement of 
establishing a scientific basis on the choice of the appropriate level of protection. Thus 
particularised national health measures result even where the scientific basis for the 
measures is same everywhere.125 
However, the choice of an appropriate level of protection is subject to some limitations. With 
regard to the determination of an appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, 
article 5.4 provides that Members should have regard for the objective of minimising 
negative trade effects. The use of the word "should" rather than "shall" , as was used in the 
previous paragraph, seems to indicate that this is not a mandatory provision but rather a 
recommendation. Article 5.5 on the other hand, obliges Members to avoid arbitrary and 
unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of protection they consider appropriate in different 
situations, if this results in discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade. Members are 
further obliged to co-operate in the SPS Committee to develop guidelines for the practical 
implementation of this provision. 
The Panel and Appellate Body in EC-Hormones found that this provision must be read 
together with the basic obligation of Members to avoid discrimination and disguised 
restrictions on trade in article 2.3.126 This provision reiterates the obligation set out in the 
chapeau to article XX of GATT 1994.127 In this case, the Appellate Body found that the goal 
of "achieving consistency in the application of the concept of appropriate level of sanitary 
and phytosanitary protection" is merely one to be achieved in the future and imposes no 
obligation of consistency in levels of protection. 
The Appellate Body also set out the elements required for a violation of this article to be 
shown. These are that: (1) the Member has set its own level of protection in different 
situations; (2) the levels of protection show arbitrary or unjustifiable differences in their 
treatment of different situations; and (3) these arbitrary or unjustifiable differences lead to 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade (referring to the effect of the measure used 
to reflect the particular level of protection). 128 These elements were found to be cumulative, 
thus proof of different treatment of different situations is not sufficient, though it might serve 
125 
126 
Atik. supra fu. 12, at 737. 
EC-Hormones supra fn. 63, para. 212. 
127 For the interpretation of this provision, see United States-Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, Apr. 29, 1996, [hereinafter referred to as US-Gasoline] at 22, 
discussed hereunder. However, the Appellate Body rejected the Panel's use of this GATT case as a precedent 
for the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement. 
128 These elements were reiterated in Australia-Salmon, supra fn. 96, para. 140. 
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as a warning signal that the measure might be discriminatory or a disguised restriction on 
trade. 
It is obvious that not all health risks can or should be treated the same. Thus, with regard to 
the first element, the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones found that to compare the different 
levels of protection deemed appropriate by a Member the situations dealt with must be 
comparable, that is, have some common element or elements.129 
Regarding the second element, the Appellate Body took into account the fact that 
governments determine levels of protection ad hoc as various health risks arise and held 
that the goal is thus not perfect consistency, but only the avoidance of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable inconsistencies. This approach is in line with the wording of the article, which 
only obliges Members to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions, not all distinctions. This 
is sensible in the light of to the exigencies of health protection decision-making. The 
difficulty in evaluating the justifiability of distinctions lies in the problem of explaining why a 
society takes some risks rather than others or values some goals more than others. It is 
therefore suggested that national choice of levels of protection should be respected except 
in "the most blatant or unexplainable cases" .130 
On the third requirement of article 5.5, the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones disagreed with 
the Panel's finding that the decisions in US-Gaso/ine131 with respect to article XX and that in 
Japan-Alcoholic Beverages132 regarding article 111:2 of GA TT 1994 can be used as 
precedents for the interpretation of article 5.5. 133 
129 The Panel had proposed that situations involving the same substance or the same adverse health effect 
could be compared (EC-Hormones Panel Report, supra fn. 63, para. 8.176). In Australia-Salmon (supra fn. 96 
at para. 146) the Appellate Body held that it is not necessary that both the disease and the associated biological 
and economic consequences be the same or similar. The fact that the risk to be assessed is the risk of both the 
entry, establishment or spread of a disease and the associated consequences was held not to be relevant to the 
question of whether different situations are comparable, thus both those risks need not be similar. Further, the 
Appellate Body found that it is not even necessary that the risk of entry, establishment or spread of a disease be 
examined to determine the comparability of situations, it is also possible to look at the risk of introduction of a 
disease, even if this is taken to mean something other than a shorthand term for entry, establishment and 
spread. Lastly, the Appellate Body stated that comparability does not require that the situations have in 
common the risk of entry, establishment or spread of all the diseases of concern - one common disease is 
sufficient. 
130 Walker, supra fn. 13, at 270. 
m US-Gasoline, supra fn. 127, at para. 22. 
132 Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, Oct. 4, 19% [hereinafter referred to asJapan-
Alcoholic Beverages) 
133 In US-Gasoline (supra fn. 127 at para. 22), the Appellate Body had found that that "arbitrary 
discrimination", "unjustifiable discrimination" and "disguised restriction on international trade" in art XX 
impart meaning to each other and that the fundamental theme is the purpose and object of avoiding abuse or 
illegitimate use of the exceptions in article XX. Thus the same considerations used to determine if a measure 
amounts to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination can be used to decide if the measure is a disguised 
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To support its finding that the difference in levels of protection for hormones and the 
antimicrobial agents, Carbadox and Olaquindox, were discriminatory or a disguised 
restriction on trade, the Panel pointed, among other factors, to the fact that the preambles 
of the relevant directives, the reports of the European Parliament and the opinions of the 
Social and Economic Committee of the EC indicated that the measure was aimed at 
harmonisation of laws within the EC, the removal of distortions of competition and barriers 
to intra-Community trade, the increase of beef consumption and the reduction of internal 
surpluses. The Appellate Body rejected this conclusion, stating that it did not attach the 
same importance as the Panel to the multiple objectives of the measure. It pointed to the 
demonstrated concerns within the EC regarding the studies showing the carcinogenicity of 
hormones, consumer concerns and the problems of abuse. It stated that the harmonisation 
of regulations was a result of the EC's mandate to establish a Common Market and that the 
reduction of beef surpluses not only benefited the EC but also other non-hormone beef 
producers. It thus concluded that it did not share the Panel's inference that the import ban 
was aimed at restricting beef imports from Canada and the US rather than protecting the 
EC's population from the risk of cancer.134 The Panel's finding that there was a violation of 
art 5.5 was thus reversed.135 The Appellate Body's decision makes it clear that the mere 
incorporation of various non-scientific considerations in the decision to impose a certain 
health measure is not sufficient to invalidate the measure. This decision implies a positive 
recognition by the Appellate Body of the important role of societal value judgements in the 
making of risk management decisions. 
restriction on international trade. The Appellate Body in EC-Hormones found that the structural differences 
between the chapeau of article XX ofGATT 1994 and article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement are too great for this 
analogous interpretation to be made (in its argument, the EC pointed out that the three elements of the chapeau 
of art. XX of GATT 1994 are in the alternative, whereas those in art. 5 .5 of the SPS Agreement are cumulative. 
See EC-Hormones supra fn. 63, para. 239). ht.Japan-Alcoholic Beverages (supra fit. 132), it was held that a 
large difference in the taxation applied to imports and that applied to domestic products could be sufficient to 
prove that it was applied so as to afford protection to domestic products, contrary to art. III of GAIT 1994. The 
Appellate Body in EC-Hormones (supra fn. 63, para. 239) distinguished the reasoning in Japan-Alcoholic 
Beverages regarding tax differentials from the different question in this case regarding different levels of health 
protection. As tax is always expressed quantitatively and affects the competitiveness of imports, a tax 
differential necessarily protects domestic products. There is no such link between differences in levels of health 
protection and the issue of discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. The extent of the 
difference is only one factor among others to be taken into account in determining whether there is 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade (EC-Hormones supra fn. 63 at fu. 251). Regard must be had 
to the circumstances of each case. 
134 See EC-Hormones supra fn. 63, para. 245. 
135 See EC-Hormones supra fn. 63, para. 246. 
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2.2.4.3 Not More Trade Restrictive than Required 
Art 5.6 obliges Members to ensure that their SPS measures are not more trade restrictive 
than required to achieve their appropriate level of protection, taking into account technical 
and economic feasibility. This amounts to a discipline on the choice of measure rather than 
on the selection of an appropriate level of protection. In a footnote, what is meant by "a 
measure not more trade restrjctive than required" is defined. In Australia-Salmon136 the 
Panel set out the three elements of this definition, which it held to be cumulative, namely 
that a measure is more trade restrictive than required only if there is another SPS measure 
which: (a) is reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility; (b) 
achieves the Member's appropriate level of sanitary protection; and (c) is significantly less 
trade restrictive than the contested measure. 
Regarding the second element, the Panel in Australia-Salmon 137 had found that the level of 
protection deemed appropriate by a Member could be implied from the level reflected in the 
SPS measure it adopts. Thus it must be determined whether the alternative measures meet 
the level of protection achieved by the measure actually imposed. The Appellate Body 
disagreed, holding that neither article 11 of the DSU, nor any other provision of the DSU or 
the SPS Agreement permits a Panel or the Appellate Body to substitute its own reasoning 
about the implied level of protection, for that consistently expressed by the Member.138 The 
determination of an appropriate level of protection was held to be the prerogative of the 
Member. It distinguished the appropriate level of protection, which is an objective, and the 
measure used to achieve that level, which is an instrument to attain this objective. The 
relationship between the two is clarified by articles 3.3, 5.3, 5.4 and most importantly 5.6. 
Thus the appropriate level of protection determines what SPS measure will be used, not 
vice versa. 139 The Appellate Body found that to imply the appropriate level of protection 
from the measure would be to assume that the measure is always successful in achieving 
the required level of protection, which is clearly not so. 
However, the Appellate Body held that although there is no explicit obligation on Members 
I 
to determine their appropriate level of protection, this obligation is implicit in paragraph 3 of 
Annex B, and articles 4.1, 5.4 and 5.6. Otherwise certain provisions of the SPS Agreement 
136 Panel Report: Australia-Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon WT/DS18/R, 12 June, 1992 
{referred to hereinafter as Australia-Salmon Panel Report], para. 95. 
137 Australia-Salmon Panel Report, supra fn. 136 at para. 8.173. 
138 Australia-Salmon, supra fn. 96, at para. 199. 
139 Australia-Salmon, supra fn. 96, at para. 203. 
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would be impossible to apply and Members would thus be able to evade their obligations.140 
If a Member does not determine its appropriate level of protection, or does so with 
insufficient clarity, Panels may determine the appropriate level based on the level reflected 
in the measure actually applied. 
This judgement is important in that prevents the discipline in article 5.6 from limiting the 
ability of governments to adopt measures that achieve the level of protection they have 
chosen. It recognises that the choice of level of protection is the sole prerogative of national 
decision-makers. Only in cases where a government does not adequately determine its 
level of protection, may a panel infer it from the measure applied in order to prevent the 
avoidance of disciplines under the SPS Agreement. 
2.2.4 Provisional Measures 
Article 5. 7 provides for cases of scientific uncertainty. This allows for provisional measures 
based on available information, provided Members seek additional information for an 
objective risk assessment and review the measure within a reasonable time. The 
requirements of this provision were set out in Japan-Agricultural Products. The Appellate 
Body held that Article 5. 7 lays down four requirements for provisional measures. Under the 
first sentence, the measure may be imposed if it is: (1) imposed in respect of a situation 
where "relevant scientific information is insufficienf' and (2) adopted "on the basis of 
available pertinent information". Under the second sentence, the measure may not be 
maintained unless the Member (1) seeks to "obtain the additional information necessary for 
a more objective assessment of risk" and (2) reviews the measure accordingly ''within a 
reasonable period of time". These requirements were held to be cumulative. The Appellate 
Body rejected Japan's claim that the words "except as provided for in article 5. 7" in article 
2.2 refer only to the first sentence of article 5.7, holding that the text of article 2.2 does not 
support this proposition as it refers to article 5. 7 as a whole. 
Japan argued that the requirement to seek additional information was met by gathering 
information through the experience of the successful importation of varieties. It claimed that 
Members are obliged to seek information but no actual results are required. The Appellate 
Body recognised that no explicit requirements were set in the SPS Agreement regarding the 
information to be collected or the collection procedure and that the results to be achieved 
140 Australia-Salmon, supra fn. 96, at para 206. 
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are not specified. However, as the information must be sought to enable a Member to make 
"a more objective assessment of the risk", the information sought must be conducive to 
making such a risk assessment, that is to evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or 
spread of the relevant pest according to the SPS measures that might be used. 
The Appellate Body also held that what is a reasonable period of time within which to review 
the measure must be decided on a case-by-case basis and depends on the circumstances 
of each case. These were held to include the difficulty of obtaining evidence and the 
characteristics of the measure. 
As mentioned above, the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones held that article 5. 7 incorporates 
and gives meaning to the precautionary principle.141 Thus the applicability of this principle 
under the SPS Agreement is limited to the situation covered by this article. This seems to 
imply that scientific uncertainty exists only in limited cases which can be dealt with be 
means of temporary solutions until certainty is achieved. The true state of affairs is, 
however, that uncertainty is a more common situation than certainty in scientific affairs. It is 
incorporated in assumptions used in risk assessments. In this way, the biases underlying 
these assumptions remain hidden. It is argued that it would be better to deal openly with the 
uncertainties inherent in scientific analysis. By recognising the pervasiveness of uncertainty 
and gaps in information in scientific analysis and allowing Members to explicitly take 
account of these problems by adopting a conservative or prudent approach to health 
regulation in terms of the precautionary principle, the SPS Agreement could contribute to 
greater transparency in regulation. 
141 See discussion in Section 2.2.4. 
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Part 3: Procedural aspects 
There are also several procedural issues relevant to the policing of public health measures 
under the world trading system which are affected by the emphasis on scientific justification. 
These pertain to the adjudication of disputes under the SPS Agreement. 
3. 1 Rules Applicable to Dispute Settlement 
In terms of article 11.1 of the SPS Agreement, articles XXll and XXlll of GA TI 1994, as 
elaborated by the Dispute Settlement Understanding 142 apply to consultations and 
settlement of disputes under the SPS Agreement, unless otherwise provided therein. 
However, article 11.3 preserves the rights of Members under other international 
agreements, including the right to avail themselves of the good offices or dispute settlement 
mechanisms of other international organisations or created by any international agreement. 
3.2 Composition of Panels 
Under the DSU, 143 if attempts to solve a dispute by means of consultations between the 
parties fail, a complaining party may request the establishment of a Panel. Thus Panels are 
created ad hoc for each dispute and there is no permanent Panel. Panels are composed of 
well-qualified governmental or non-governmental individuals with expertise {practical or 
academic) in the area of trade law or policy. 144 A list is kept by the Secretariat, with the 
names of persons suggested by Member governments who meet the requirements of article 
8. 1. Members may suggest new persons for inclusion on this list, providing information on 
their expertise in the area of international trade and the subject matter of the covered 
agreements. It is thus clear that Panellists are primarily trade experts. Although it is possible 
that persons with additional knowledge in the area of SPS protection may be included 
among them, there is no requirement that panels hearing cases on health measures include 
such persons. 
142 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 to the 
Marrakesh Agreement of 1994 (supra fu. 1) [hereinafter referred to as the DSU]. 
143 DSU supra fu. 142, art. 6. 
144 DSU supra fu. 142, art. 8.1. 
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There have been calls for reform in this area. Bearing in mind the often complex scientific 
issues that are involved in health regulation, it seems unlikely that persons without scientific 
expertise in this area would be in a position to make judgements thereon. This is particularly 
the case when one has regard to the broad ambit of the Panel's powers of review of the 
regulatory determinations of Member governments, as discussed below.145 It has been 
argued that the primary focus on the trade expertise of Pan~llists leads to a definite slant 
towards free trade goals in Panel decisions, which results in inadequate attention being 
paid to the equally important aim of the protection of public health. WhaNs suggested is a 
more balanced composition of Panels, including experts in both trade and public health.146 
In principle, this would apply to many of the various sectors of the covered agreements 
where expertise in trade matters alone is insufficient to lead to a balanced decision, 
reflecting the conflicting interests involved. Admittedly, it would pe problematic to find so 
many qualified individuals willing and able to serve on Panels on an ad hoc basis. One has 
to bear in mind that these persons are often government officials or persons in the private 
sector who have to take time out from their busy schedules to attend the Panel 
proceedings. Thus another suggestion has been made, namely that there should be a 
professionalisation of Panels. In other words, permanent Panels should be created, 
composed of individuals with expertise in the relevant areas of the covered agreements. 
These panellists would thus be salaried employees of the WTO, and would be able to 
develop a strong expertise in the agreements they would deal with. 
3.5.3 Establishment of Expert Review Groups or use of Scientific Experts 
An attempt to deal with the lack of scientific expertise of Panellists is reflected generally in 
article 13 of the DSU and for health matters more specifically in article 11.2 of the SPS 
Agreement. Article 13.1 of the DSU authorises Panels to seek information and technical 
advice from any individual or body. Article 13.2 allows Panels to seek information from any 
source and to consult experts or request advisory reports from expert review. 147 Article 11.2 
of the SPS Agreement states that in disputes under that Agreement, involving scientific or 
145 See Section 3.5 below. 
146 A precedent for this might be the provision in art. 8.10 of the I)SU (supra fn. 142) allowing 
developing country Members involved in disputes to insist that at least one panellist come from a developing 
country. This does not envisage that this panellist will favour developing countries, but that he or she will have 
a better understanding of the situation under dispute. The same rationale would apply to the inclusion of 
experts in SPS matters. See Steve Charnovitz, "Environment and health under WTO dispute settlement," The 
International Lawyer 32 (1998): 901at918. 
147 These groups are set up in terms of Appendix 4 of the DSU (supra fn. 142). 
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technical issues, a Panel should consult experts chosen by it in consultation with the 
parties. For this purpose, the Panel may set up advisory technical experts groups or consult 
relevant international organisations. 
In EC-Hormones148 the Appellate Body affirmed the Panel's right to receive opinions from 
experts in their individual capacity rather than set up expert review groups. Article 11.2 of 
the SPS Agreement and article 13.2 of the DSU together with Appendix 4, do not limit this 
right. These provisions leave it to the discretion of the Panel to determine whether an expert 
review group should be established. Both provisions require the Panel to consult the 
parties to the dispute in the selection of experts. Since experts were chosen in terms of 
procedures agreed upon by the parties in this case, the Appellate Body found that the 
Panel had acted consistently with the article 13.2 and Appendix 4 of the DSU and article 
11.2 of the SPS Agreement. 
In this regard it should be noted that scientists consulted individually are unlikely to provide 
a clear picture of the state of scientific knowledge on an issue. Scientists' views reflect the 
scientific tradition of which they are part. 149 An expert review group is more conducive to 
understanding the range of possible interpretations of scientific data. 
3.4 Burden of Proof 
The question of which party bears the evidentiary burden is of particular importance in the 
case of disputes on health measures due to the degree of scientific uncertainty that exists 
in this area. 
The Appellate Body first set out the burden of proof rules in US-Shirts and Blouses.1$0 
There it recognised that various international tribunals and most national jurisdictions apply 
the rule that the party who asserts a fact, whether plaintiff or respondent, must prove it. 
Once a party has adduced sufficient evidence to create a presumption that what is claimed 
is true, in other words established a prima facie case, the evidentiary burden shifts to the 
other party who must rebut the presumption or lose the case. In EC-Hormones the 
148 EC-Hormones, supra fn. 63, para. 147. 
According to Atik (supra fn. 12 at 757), scientists are more likely to recognise a scientific justification 
for a measure where the scientific assertion is accepted in the scientific community to which they belong. 
150 United States - Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 
149 
WT/DS33/AB/R, 23 May, 1997 at 14-16. 
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Appellate Body held that this rule applies equally to disputes under the SPS Agreement. It 
rejected the Panel's finding that the SPS Agreement allocates the burden of proof to the 
Member imposing the SPS measure.151 
In Japan..Agricultural Products152 the interaction between the obligation of a party to prove a 
prima facie case of inconsistency and the investigative authority of a panel was examined 
by the Appellate Body. In this case, the US had argued that Japan's varietal testing 
requirement was more trade restrictive than required to meet Japan's appropriate level of 
protection, contrary to article 5.6. It claimed that testing by product was an alternative 
measure, meeting the article 5.6 requirements. The Panel found that this measure would 
not meet Japan's appropriate level of protection. However, it went on to deduce another 
alternative measure, neither claimed nor argued by the US, from the opinions given by its 
expert advisors. 153 Although the Panel acknowledged that the US had not argued that this 
measure, the determination of sorption levels, met any of the three requirements of article 
5.6, it held that it could be presumed that the requirements were met and that the US had 
offered views consistent with this. 
The Appellate Body found that the US was obliged to establish a prima facie case that an 
alternative measure exists meeting all three requirements of article 5.6. As it had not even 
claimed that determination of sorption levels was such a measure, it did not meet its 
obligation. It recognised that the Panel is entitled under article 13 of the DSU to seek 
information from any relevant source and to consult experts, and that it is instructed under 
article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement to seek expert advice in technical and scientific matters. 
However, it held that this authority cannot be used to rule in favour of a party that has not 
established a prima facie case of inconsistency on grounds of the specific claims it 
asserted. The expert advice sought by the Panel is intended to help it understand and 
evaluate the evidence submitted and arguments made by the parties, not to make the 
complainant party's case for it. This finding is important in clarifying the respective roles of 
the Panel and the parties before it in the proceedings. It establishes that the panel 
151 The Appellate Body (supra fu. 63 at para. 102-105) dealt with the three grounds for the Panel's 
finding in turn. Firstly, it rejected the Panel's conclusion that the fact that many SPS provisions are worded 
"Members shall ensure that. .. " has any logical connection to the allocation of the evidentiary burden. Secondly, 
it held that article 5.8, under which Members may ask for an explanation of the reasons for an SPS measure 
from another Member and the latter is obliged to comply with the request, does not purport to address burden of 
proof issues, contrary to the Panel's finding. Instead this article is most likely to be used in pre-dispute 
situations in order to enable a Member to acquire information which it could later use to meet its burden of 
proof in dispute settlement proceedings. 
152 Japan-Agricultural Products, supra fu. 50, para. 120-131. 
153 Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, W'f/DS76/R, 27 Oct. 1998 [hereinafter referred to as 
Japan-Agricultural Product Panel Report}, para. 8.74. 
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procedure is adversarial, with the Panel acting as an impartial arbiter, rather than 
inquisitorial, where the Panel would have a more active role in the investigation of the facts 
and establishment of a case. The Panel's investigative authority is meant only to help its 
own understanding and evaluation of the cases presented by the parties before it. 
3. 5 Standard of Review 
The issue of the appropriate standard of review is an important one, as it raises the 
question of whether Panels are entitled to interfere in Members' regulatory determinations, 
or whether they must defer to such decisions and confine themselves to the question of 
whether the procedural rules in making these decisions have been followed. This is crucial 
to the question of the limits to the policing of national regulatory choices in favour of free 
trade. 
In EC-Horrnones154 the question of the appropriate standard of review was first dealt with. 
The EC argued that the Panel had failed to apply the appropriate standard of review, which 
it asserted to be a "deferential reasonableness standard", as exists for the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement.155 Under such a standard, the Panel should not interfere in the investigation 
conducted on national level which led to the establishment of the measure. It should limit 
itself to determining whether the procedure set by WTO rules has been followeo. Thus, if 
the Member has property established the facts and conducted an objective, unbiased 
examination thereof, its conclusions should be deferred to by the Panel, even if it would 
have come to a different conclusion on the facts. Instead, the EC argued that the Panel had 
undertaken a de novo standard of review, under which it has complete freedom to examine 
the factual and procedural validity of the decision and to come to a different conclusion. 
The Appellate Body rejected the extension of the standard of review set in the Anti-
Dumping Agreement to the SPS Agreement, holding that this standard is textually specific 
to the former agreement and there is no evidence of an intention to adopt it in the latter 
agreement. Instead, it focused on the need for the standard of review applied to the SPS 
Agreement to reflect the balance created in that agreement between the jurisdictional 
154 EC-Hormones, supra fu. 63, para. 133. 
155 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 
(reprinted in The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts (1994) 
GAIT Secretariat, Geneva at 168-196) [hereinafter referred to as the Anti-Dumping Agreement] at article 17.6 
(i). 
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competences transferred by Members to the WTO and those retained by them. Neither the 
Panel nor the Appellate Body is authorised to change this balance. However, it could be 
argued that where this balance lies is not made explicit in the SPS Agreement and there is 
thus room for interpretation. 
The Appellate Body found that although the SPS Agreement is silent on the issue of the 
standard of review, the DSU articulates this standard both for the determination of the facts 
and the legal characterisation of these facts, in article 11. The standard of review 
established by this article is neither deference nor de novo review, but rather the objective 
assessment of the facts (with respect to fact-finding) and an objective assessment of the 
matter, including the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements 
(with respect to legal issues). Thus whether the Panel's analysis is purely procedural or also 
substantive depends on the specific provision at issue.156 Where the provision in question 
contains substantive elements, the Panel is at liberty to conduct a substantive analysis. 
There is thus no room for deference to the Member's regulatory determinations. The 
question arises whether this general rule is appropriate to the special circumstances of the 
SPS Agreement. This can be better decided in the light of the application thereof by the 
Appellate Body. 
The issue of whether the appropriate standard of review was used thus depends, according 
to the Appellate Body, on the question whether there was an objective assessment of the 
matter, including an objective assessment of the facts. It held that failure to conduct such 
an objective assessment requires proof that there has been deliberate disregard of or 
refusal to consider submitted evidence or wilful distortion or misrepresentation of the 
evidence. These do not indicate a mere error of judgement but imply an egregious error, 
which calls into question the good faith of the Panel. It is apparent that the Appellate Body 
will not lightly find that this element of bad faith is present, as can be seen from its finding in 
this case that although the Panel had misquoted and misinterpreted the evidence, its 
actions had not been deliberate and there had thus been no failure to make an objective 
assessment of the facts. 157 It thus seems that the only limitation on the powers of review of 
the Panel, is its obligation to act in good faith. For the rest, it seems the Panel is free to 
substitute its own judgement for that of the Member government without any real limits. 
156 Hurst, supra fn. 43, at 27. 
157 This trend continued in both Australia-Salmon (supra, fn. 96, pata. 266) and Japan-Agricultural 
Products (supra, fn. 50, para. 142), where errors of the Panel in the appreciation of evidence were not 
characterised as failures to make an objective assessment of the facts, due to lack of an egregious nature. 
43 
Due to the limited interpretation given by the Appellate Body to the requirement to conduct 
an objective assessment, it is clear that the parties are to a large degree at the mercy of the 
Panel when it comes to its review of the evidence before it. This is problematic when one 
bears in mind the composition of Panels and their lack of expertise in scientific matters. 
Despite a lack of bad faith on the part of the Panel, it could still completely misunderstand 
or mischaracterise evidence before it. The lack of certainty that often exists in the scientific 
arena means that the Panel's possibility to consult experts does not constitute a real 
safeguard. The Panel is free to ascribe more weight to the opinions of its experts than those 
advising Member governments. This is a dangerous situation. 
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Part 4: Conclusion 
The analysis of the use of science-based disciplines in the SPS Agreement, and their 
application and interpretation by wro dispute settlement organs, brings to light certain 
important issues. These relate to the appropriateness of elevating science to the role of 
mediator in the conflict between free trade goals and the protection of public health. 
What is immediately apparent is the need to take a realistic view of science itself and its 
limitations. While it would be very convenient to have a totally objective and universally valid 
standard against which to evaluate government health regulations, providing unassailable 
legitimacy to wro disciplines, it is time to acknowledge that things are more complex than 
that. Science is imperfect, value-ridden and subject to differing interpretations. It can thus 
not provide the standard required. 
While the SPS Agreement, and the interpretation thereof by wro Panels and the Appellate 
Body, to some extent take account of this reality by making small concessions for scientific 
uncertainty and diversity of scientific opinion, this does not go far enough. The all-
pervasiveness of scientific uncertainty and the social policy considerations that form an 
integral part of health regulation need to be explicitly recognised. These considerations 
make it obvious that science is not a useful tool for the determination of the validity of 
regulations aimed at protecting public health. Attempts to use this unrealistic standard can 
only lead to increasing the threat to human health inherent in trade liberalisation efforts. 
When one bears in mind the very high value that society attaches to human life and health, 
it is clear that this result is unacceptable. 
It is particularly important to recognise this reality now, when the Millennium Round trade 
negotiations are in progress. There is urgent need for the reform of wro rules relating to 
health measures. Such reform would go a long way to allaying the fears in society that have 
led to the massive protests against the continuation of tr<.Jde liberalisation in the Millennium 
Round. This recognition would also prevent the extension of science-based disciplines to 
other areas, such as environmental regulation. 
It is submitted that the use of an unrealistic and impracticable standard for policing 
government regulations, however prestigious and seemingly neutral it may be, ultimately 
does not serve the ends of the multilateral trade regime. 
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